Sep 6, 2022
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Why did the Russian troops decide to give the village of Vysokopole to the Armed Forces of Ukraine

It is possible that the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Kherson will be able to keep Vysokopolye and Sukhoi Stavok, but they will not advance further. Exchanging 500-600 people who are out of action for two villages is a bad result. Kherson region cannot be returned like that. Namely, this is what the Armed Forces of Ukraine set as their goal during the offensive, according to military journalist Roman Saponkov, who works in Kherson. He spoke about this in an interview with

— Roman, you have criticized those who are panicking because our forces have left Vysokopolye on your telegram channel. You also noted that the RF Ministry of Defense gave objective information about the departure and called it a positive shift. Please explain your position.

“Thus, we did not give Ukrainian propaganda a reason to say that “the Russian authorities are hiding something, because the situation is much worse.” If the Ministry of Defense and the Russian press had rested on the fact that “there was no surrender of the village and ours were there”, and after that they would have raised the Ukrainian flag over the village, everything would have been much worse.

They really raised the Ukrainian flag on the western outskirts of the village near the hospital. But they could ride with the flag all over the village. And then they would have thrown in a fake about the liberation of several more villages.

If you look at the map, it might seem that our group is sitting almost in a semi-encirclement and its affairs are catastrophic. This would not be true, but it would be even more difficult to refute it.

And then we admitted that we had left the village after a heroic defense. We did not lose people in a useless bodalov for one settlement. We retreated and regrouped. Informationally, this is very important. We competently intercepted all this media hysteria.

Why did the Ministry of Defense build its information policy in this way, although earlier they preferred to deny the problems? Because we feel confident. We understand that the enemy, with the current configuration of the front and grouping, will not advance anywhere.

The occupation of one village, which until then was in the gray zone and since March has changed hands (we just did not pay attention to it), will not give them anything.

Victory will be ours. Not only near Kherson, but in general in this campaign.

“Is there still a danger that the enemy will be able to overwhelm us with meat in this direction?”

– Not. The events of the First World War and the Great Patriotic War show that a breakthrough by infantry with weak support from artillery and mechanized corps almost always either leads to the collapse of the group and its rollback, or gives weak results, as it will now.

The Syrian government had a similar situation from 2011 to 2015, when, due to the unpreparedness of the Syrian army for major offensive operations, the government tried to exchange the lives of soldiers for small territories. By the time our troops arrived, the Syrian army was completely incompetent.

It is possible that the enemy will be able to hold Vysokopolye and Sukhoi Stavok (on the Andreevsky bridgehead in the Davydov Brod area), but will not advance further. To exchange 500-600 out-of-service people for two villages is so-so. It has no prospects. Kherson region cannot be returned like that. Namely, this was the goal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the offensive.

– Are there any forecasts when we will launch a full-fledged counteroffensive and liberate these two villages?

No one reports to me for obvious reasons. This is a military secret. We are still not exactly sure where the enemy strikes the main blow.

It is not a fact that the main strike is planned in the Sukhoi Stavka or Vysokopolie area. It is possible that this is a diversionary strike with the aim of a breakthrough. Moreover, this breakthrough may not even be near Kherson, but in the Kharkov direction.

Therefore, now to draw some conclusions, especially based on rumors about the movement of troops or the pulling up of artillery, is to help the enemy.

We can recall Operation Bagration in 1944, when we were able to secretly concentrate a powerful strike force in the Belarusian direction. If someone is speculating about a Russian counter-offensive, they either don’t have the information or are trying to get the enemy’s attention.

– The Ukrainian media are now full of reports of clogged hospitals in Odessa, Nikolaev and Krivoy Rog. The Kyiv regime forbade journalists to publish information other than reports from the General Staff. Moreover, there was no such sharp reaction to the losses in the Donbass in Ukraine. Is it really possible to talk about panic in the ranks of the enemy?

– Yes. The Internet is full of obituaries for battalion commanders, majors and lieutenant colonels. Naturally, a lot of soldiers. Ukrainian public pages are full of requests to find information about the missing: “Help me find information about such and such a unit, which was based there.” Their losses are very serious.

I would not confidently say that two to four thousand people died in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A unit is considered incapable of defense if it has lost 30% of its personnel in killed and wounded. At 10% loss, the unit is considered unable to attack. If two thousand people died there, then the enemy would stop the fighting and show no activity, but he still attacks desperately.

But even if the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost up to a thousand people killed in a week, this is still a lot. For example, the losses of the Russian group during the two years of the Second Chechen campaign amounted to five thousand people. Losing so much in a week is very serious.

I’m not talking about panic. To do this, it is necessary to live in Ukrainian society. But there questions begin to arise. There is a version that this “offensive” was launched to distract society from internal squabbles and internal problems. If true, these losses could be cause for protest. Although, I don’t know if it will be provoked from below.

— How will the situation around the Zaporozhye NPP end? Will Ukraine again send saboteurs on barges after the visit of the IAEA mission?

– After the visit of the IAEA, there should be a de-escalation. Prior to the visit, Ukraine carried out carpet bombing there. This is not an exaggeration. The nuclear power plant flew several times a day. Shells landed next to spent waste storage barrels and next to reactor halls with turbine coolers.

It’s not even playing with fire. They essentially grilled shish kebab on a powder keg. But now there has been a de-escalation. Because the visit of the IAEA could not be ignored. This is a serious international organization, albeit a controlling supervisory body.

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