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Aug 9, 2022
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Six main myths about CBO

Why are the Armed Forces of Ukraine still shelling the cities of Donbass? How many aircraft are used during the special operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces and how successfully? Are tanks used correctly? These and other similar questions gave rise to a series of myths about the actions of Russian troops during the special operation.

The special operation taking place in Ukraine is the main source of information stories in recent months, especially for the blogging and other non-systemic network community, which often assesses the events in Ukraine in an amateurish way. In this environment, frankly mythical assumptions about the situation in the war zone are generated. Undergoing various mutations as the discussion progresses, giving rise to new considerations, they form an information field, which is sometimes weakly connected with reality. This is how the myths about the special operation are born. We list a few of the most common.

1. Why shelling of peaceful cities of Donbass continues

One of the most widespread was the myth that Russian troops cannot (do not want to) fight against enemy artillery, which is shelling residential areas of the LDNR. The media describe the consequences of the strikes in detail and in colors every day. This causes people to naturally protest and misunderstand why the army cannot stop such strikes. “Military experts” are beginning to give out their conjectures about the inability to effectively conduct counter-battery combat.

However, the real problem lies elsewhere. As you know, the Armed Forces of Ukraine strive to make the most of the residential and industrial development of settlements. This is their sensible strategy from the very beginning of hostilities. Another confirmation of this manner of action was the scandalous investigation by Amnesty International, which so outraged Kyiv. Guns, mostly towed, as well as MLRS, are installed by the Ukrainian military near residential buildings. At the same time, residents are prohibited from leaving them. It is especially dangerous when the Armed Forces of Ukraine use high-rise buildings for cover. Having completed the fire mission (this can be from 5-10 to 20 volleys), the APU battery collapses and moves to another point, as a rule, also in a residential area. The total duration of the gun at the firing point can be from five to seven to 20 minutes.

It seemed like a big time. The Russian army is armed with, for example, the Zooart artillery reconnaissance complex, which is capable of determining the location of the gun that fired it from the trajectory of the projectile – but with some error. Such data is enough to strike back literally in a matter of minutes, which is done if such a weapon is located outside a residential area. But if it stands in the courtyard of a residential area, surrounded by high-rise buildings or in a densely built-up private sector, then the errors in the location of this gun already cover several houses that fall into the affected area. To this we must add the technical dispersion of the gun shells, which increases with wear. And the artillery fire is very intense.

Thus, an attempt to destroy an enemy weapon in a residential area with a retaliatory artillery or missile strike leads to the risk of casualties among the civilian population and the destruction of residential infrastructure. And such guns in these conditions must be destroyed at least a few. And the expected casualties of the civilian population from such a counter-battery fight can be numerous.

In other words, to save a few people in Donetsk, you will have to sacrifice hundreds of lives in another city in the Donetsk Republic. The Armed Forces of Ukraine hide behind civilians as a human shield – and this tactic, admittedly, works.

Aviation can be used, especially since Russia has achieved air supremacy over the combat area. An ATGM strike from a helicopter, which has a combat cumulative warhead of only 5-9 kg, will guarantee the destruction of the gun without damaging residential buildings. However, this is where the time factor comes into play. Helicopters and airplanes cannot stay in the air for a long time, especially in the area where they are threatened by MANPADS. Therefore, they either hang in safe areas, or are at the airport ready to take off.

The time to reach the point of impact of an aircraft or helicopter in the air can vary widely and, according to the experience of American aviation, can be from 15 to 30 minutes. And even more from the airfield – from 30 to 50 minutes or more, depending on the remoteness of the base area from the strike site. During this time, the enemy manages in most cases to change the position of even towed guns.

Of course, it is possible to find an enemy gun in position before he had time to leave it or on the march to another area. Our troops successfully destroy enemy artillery outside residential or industrial buildings. But it’s hard to do it quickly. The Armed Forces of Ukraine still have a large amount of artillery. NATO also contributes. Therefore, a difficult and systematic struggle is being waged. This struggle has already brought its successes – according to the Ukrainian side, for every Ukrainian trunk, Russia has more than a dozen of its own. But at the time of the start of the special operation, we had parity in terms of the number of artillery weapons in the troops of the first line.

2. Why Ukrainian artillery has not been completely suppressed

Another myth is that Ukrainian artillery, although less numerous, is used more effectively than Russian artillery. This statement is broken by the very fact that at the moment we have more than a tenfold superiority in artillery. And this despite the fact that initially both armies, both Russian and Ukrainian, had approximately the same amount of artillery. At the time of the start of the special operation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had a full-fledged grouping with a full set of counter-battery weapons and trained personnel – however, as a result, at the moment this grouping has completely lost the battle for fire superiority.

What superiority in the effectiveness of the use of artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can we talk about now, when they no longer have a more or less acceptable amount of counter-battery weapons and trained personnel? And shooting at peaceful cities is just evidence of weakness. In addition to the desire to implement the scorched earth tactics, firing at civilian targets may indicate that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unable to issue target designation of their artillery against enemy troops.

3. Are tanks being used correctly?

Another myth is that the Russian army does not carry out deep tank breakthroughs because the enemy has a powerful anti-tank defense. It is worth recalling here that a tank is a weapon designed to fight mainly in open spaces. No wonder there is such a thing as “tank-dangerous” or “tank-accessible” terrain. Dense urban development is not one of those.

During the Great Patriotic War, our tank commanders avoided fighting in the city. And tank breakthroughs took place on the ground outside the settlements with overcoming the enemy’s field defenses. In the cities, tanks were used in conjunction with the infantry as a means of its fire reinforcement.

This is exactly how tanks are used today within the framework of the NWO. After all, the war zone in the LDNR agglomeration is actually a zone of continuous industrial and residential development. As for the breakthroughs, they were in the initial phase of the operation, when our troops reached the Kyiv-Kherson line in a few days. However, the need to eliminate the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, dug in in the western regions of the LDNR, made it necessary to concentrate the main efforts on solving this problem.

It is worth recalling here that in this region the Armed Forces of Ukraine created a group of about 150 thousand people. At Paulus near Stalingrad, a group of 330 thousand people was surrounded – quite comparable to what Ukraine had in the LDNR. During the liquidation of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht in the city, tanks were also not very actively used, since the main role was played by infantry and artillery.

4. What is the role of artillery

One can come across the opinion that the SVO takes us back to the times of the First World War, when it was artillery that played the main role on the battlefields. Formally, this is true, but in fact it is not. The Russian army has huge stocks of ammunition left over from Soviet times. Their massive use is fully justified. Moreover, the main targets are areal objects such as areas of concentration of troops. At the same time, the use of extremely expensive weapons – high-precision systems of different ranges – in such conditions is not entirely advisable, given that there is no serious opposition to our artillery and aviation from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

5. Is there enough aviation

There are arguments about the lower intensity of the use of Russian aviation due to the threat of the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has retained its combat capability, in particular, MANPADS. In fact, the intensity of the use of aviation is not at all low. The data of the Ministry of Defense speak of the defeat of 50-60 to 100-120 or more objects by operational (formerly front-line) and army aviation. If we assume that a pair of vehicles was allocated for each target (and it cannot be less, a pair is the minimum tactical unit of aviation), then

Every day, from 100-120 to 200-240 or more sorties are carried out (after all, a much larger detachment of forces than a pair is allocated for a number of large targets) of aircraft and helicopters.

According to the experience of using US aviation in various conflicts, in the course of systematic combat operations, one aircraft has an average of one sortie per day. If the RF Aerospace Forces act in a similar way, then it turns out that about 200 aircraft and helicopters are involved and fully used in the NWO. This is a large part of the total combat strength of Russian aviation. So aviation is fully used, and Ukraine’s air defense does not interfere with this. Even helicopters operate successfully, which indicates that the American “Stingers” cannot counteract them, which could force them to abandon the use of these machines.

6. Are the bombers efficient?

In addition, there was an opinion about the insufficient use of bomber aircraft. Namely, about the difficulties of using free-fall bombs due to the threat of enemy air defense.

In reality, bomber aviation is used within the framework of the assigned tasks. Some of our aircraft have a system that allows bombing with high accuracy, achieving accuracy in hitting the designated point with free-fall bombs with a deviation of 50-100 meters standard deviation. We also have aircraft that can easily wipe out a small or even medium-sized city from the face of the earth in one blow by a group of 10-30 aircraft. These are strategic aircraft (Tu-160) and long-range aviation (Tu-22m3). However, by destroying the enemy in this way, we will destroy the entire population of the settlement. For obvious reasons, this cannot be done.

On the one hand, myths make it difficult to understand the real picture of the actions of the troops. However, the very fact of the appearance of these myths testifies to the increased interest of society in the liberation of Ukraine from Nazism. About indifference to what is happening. And this is a necessary prerequisite for victory.

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