What tasks will be assigned to those hundreds of thousands of new servicemen who will be mobilized for a special military operation in Ukraine? There are several of these tasks, and some of them are of fundamental importance. The replenishment should change the very nature of the ongoing military operations in Ukraine.
In connection with partial mobilization, first of all, one can come across statements that its main task is to establish reliable control over the territories already liberated in Ukraine by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Roughly speaking, echelon the front line.
This implies a transition to defensive operations in the Nikolaev-Kryvyi Rih and Zaporozhye directions and in the general vector to Kharkov. Which is somewhat at odds with the concept of referendums in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, since they imply the entry into the Russian Federation of the entire “listed” territory of the regions in the format in which they are drawn on the maps of the Ukrainian SSR. Earlier, the same story happened with the DPR and LPR, which were recognized as states precisely within the old borders.
But it is really extremely necessary to saturate the front with personnel. According to rough estimates, purely quantitatively, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the allies lag behind the standards adopted in military science (the number of soldiers per kilometer of the front) by about four times.
Moreover, in a number of areas there are even more, since in those zones where offensive operations are carried out, the concentration of troops and means is more significant. Operational reserves are drawn there, and, in turn, other fragments of the front, on which there is a long lull, are weakening. At the operational-headquarters level, something like the Japanese game of Go begins, in which one form of strategy is to crush the opponent’s line numerically by moving pieces there.
The enemy, on the other hand, switched to the principles of total war long ago and does not take into account the losses and the number of mobilized. The Ukrainian side has an almost unlimited (for this theater of operations) mobilization resource, since they have no restrictions on conscription. Mobilization in Ukraine is total, and the elderly, seriously ill, and even disabled people are already being taken into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Under such conditions, the enemy can form what he calls operational reserves and bombard the front line with manpower in endless attempts at counteroffensives.
This is one of the worst tactics of the wars of the mid-twentieth century, but the enemy uses it, which means that it must be reacted to. Consequently, a significant part of the mobilized should simply fill the front line with themselves, thereby eliminating the dangerous numerical advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
On the southern sector of the front, the advanced line goes straight across the steppe. There are far fewer settlements to cling to than in the industrial and densely populated Donbass, where any settlement easily turns into a fortress. And now quantitatively it is very difficult to create a full-fledged veil in this direction. We have to cling to every settlement, just like in the Donbass.
On the other hand, it is in the Donbass that one has to deal with the layered defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for which the available forces are also insufficient. Nevertheless, the standards for the number of personnel during the offensive and defense were not invented from the ceiling, they were written in blood.
Earlier, some experts spoke about the possibility of forming an entire army corps in the RF Armed Forces from scratch. However, it is not customary to disperse the forces of a large military formation, therefore, this corps could only be used in its entirety and in one place. In other words, the new army corps was supposed to prepare a major offensive operation, and not on the Donetsk sector of the front. Now is not the time to speculate exactly where that might have happened. The concept has changed, and most likely, there is no point in forming any new large military units from scratch from those mobilized.
On the other hand, it is already clear that before being sent to the front, all mobilized will undergo retraining. Since it is assumed that these are experienced and already trained people, it will not take much time for this. This time will be spent on combat coordination. That is, ready-made crews (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles), crews (artillery, MLRS, air defense) and units (melee scouts) will arrive in the zone of a special military operation. And such cells can easily merge into existing units, and in this way they can, as it were, be “sprayed” along the entire front. Especially where reinforcement is required in connection with the assigned tasks.
Namely, the tasks assigned to the grouping will determine where and by what forces such strengthening will be carried out. A grouping of about half a million people with modern weapons cannot stand still. One should almost certainly expect offensive activity from the Russian Armed Forces, and much more intense than it has been in the past few months.
Consequently, the other part of those mobilized after training in combat coordination should reinforce those subunits that will be included in the first place in offensive groupings. Such an increase in numbers will pass unnoticed by the enemy, since there will be no change of units on the front line. The units will simply have new battalion groups. Such amplification is almost impossible to determine visually and even electronically.
It is difficult to foresee which areas will be strengthened by a conditional curtain, and which ones will be prepared for offensives. There are, of course, obvious things (the steppe sections of the front must be strengthened unequivocally, as well as the regions of the north of the LPR and the Ugledar direction in the DPR). On the other hand, no one canceled the opportunity to continue the offensive on Nikolaev – Odessa or to the north on Krivoy Rog.
But there is another nuance. Given the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is imperative to “turn off” all long-range artillery systems and MLRS supplied to Ukraine by the West, as well as all Ukrainian tactical air defense. This weapon hits civilian targets. This whole orchestra must be silenced. And for counter-battery combat, experienced artillerymen, gunners, UAV operators and scouts are required.
And, finally, another group of mobilized reservists can represent a conditionally rear component. This is not about purely rear structures, but about new units that can carry out garrison service in the liberated territories. They must combine both police and security functions, and represent the very operational reserve of light infantry, which is always in short supply when it is so needed.
This gradation, of course, is conditional, since mobilization teams are formed for a specific target designation. The fundamental thing here seems to be the desire to saturate the front not just with a curtain, but to turn the group involved in the NWO into a kind of shock fist,
in which the proportion of specialists will, if not exceed the number of “simple” infantry, then certainly will increase significantly. And this will change the very nature of hostilities.
First of all, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will no longer be distracted by conditionally “weak”, that is, sectors of the front that are not quantitatively provided. In addition, it will be possible to forget about the constant plugging of holes by transferring forces from one area to another. There will be an operational reserve.
The planning of offensive operations will acquire a regular character, and it will be possible to carry out several offensives – simultaneously on different sectors of the front. And, finally, with the help of new reinforcements, the consequences of the use of Western models of weapons, which in the last month began to prevail in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, can be stopped.