In the previous article, we identified who launched mantras like "Church outside politics", who created the bogey "political Orthodoxy" and, most importantly, tried to prove that politics cannot be a zone of alienation for the Church. Moreover, the Church has a duty to pursue policies in the interests of its members. So what should Orthodox politics be like?
Earlier, in the era of Christian states, the Church did not face such a question, because she had to give a moral assessment to the deeds of the authorities, whose representatives were her children, called to be guided by the interests of the Church (whose main goal is the salvation of souls). Spiritual power in the state ideally belonged to the Church. And this is already politics, isn't it? However, what Orthodox policy should be in a state that is constitutionally separated from the church?
The principle of the secularity of the state in no way deprives the Church of the right to assess the actions of the authorities. And the main purpose of the Church - the salvation of souls in the conditions of any state and any state policy - is higher than the requirement of loyalty to the state. A number of bishops (we will name them later) believe that if the government forces the believers to apostate from Christ (remember the administrative eviction of state employees to the "religious processions of the SCU"?) or sinful, soul-damaging deeds from the point of view of Orthodoxy (for example, introducing "sex education" into the compulsory school curriculum), Church should refuse to obey the state. The hierarchy may even appeal to their children with an appeal for "peaceful civil disobedience"...
And vice versa, The Church can appeal to state power with an appeal to use power in cases where the activities of individual citizens, social groups or parties pose a threat to society or its part - the church.
Let us emphasize that we are now citing the opinion of the rulers whom no one has yet managed to accuse of "political Orthodoxy". Let's call them all the same. These bishops are all the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate. Including all the bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. For the above provisions are taken from the Social Concept of the ROC, adopted in 2000 at the Bishops' Council of the ROC, in which, of course, the entire episcopate of the UOC (MP) and other parts of the Russian Church took part. Two years later, this document almost entirely formed the basis of the Social Concept of the UOC (MP).
It also lists the desirable "areas of collaboration between the Church and the state in the current historical period." Among them:
- peacekeeping at the international, interethnic and civil levels (which, in fact, is what His Beatitude Metropolitan Onuphry is doing, "interfering" not only in "domestic" politics (relations between official Kiev and the self-proclaimed republics), but also in international (peacekeeping relations with the "aggressor state");
- concern for the preservation of morality in society, support for the institution of family, motherhood and childhood (including through criticism of the initiatives of parliamentary parties in the field of family law, "gender equality" and "sexual reforms", that is, "interference in legislative policy");
- dialogue with public authorities of any branches and levels on issues that are significant for the Church and society, including in connection with the development of relevant laws, by-laws, orders and decisions (what is this if not direct participation in politics?);
- spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and upbringing.
Alas, in the last point, the synodal departments have a subsidence. I remember that back in 2005, shortly after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Radio Radonezh inquired from the then Deputy Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Fr. Vsevolod Chaplin, "What could be the role of the priesthood in opposing the orange"...
“Our parishes should become centers of social action- answered the priest. - The creation of youth groups, military-patriotic circles, the organization of youth camps - all this can be done by a community of competent, responsible lay people. The priest, however, must take on spiritual leadership. "... At that time it was almost impossible in Ukraine, the moment was missed. In the Russian Federation, as Fr. Vsevolod, this kind of initiative found active support from local administrations. And he urged to develop this interaction before it is too late: “We must strive for contact with the secular authorities. It is very important that the authorities, as a result of this contact, finally understand that it is worth working with real forces, and not with virtual public organizations that can be created or disbanded. Let the first be more difficult, and the second easier. Here, in my opinion, is the best defense against all color revolutions "...
Not at nightfall, the aforementioned "orange" (including the "pop group" Drabinko) will say: here it is - political Orthodoxy. But at the same time in Ukraine (that is, under the Drabinka leadership of the Kiev Metropolitanate of the UOC-MP), a scout movement was developing, which provided for the mastery of such an "apolitical" topic as the national self-identification "Ukrainians or Muscovites?" This happened through the realization of such historical milestones as the "Union of Mazepa with the King of Sweden Karl XII in the fight against Russia", "Emsky decree", "Education in the Austro-Hungarian army of the Ukrainian Legion of Sich Riflemen", "formation in Vienna of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists ( banned in Russia OUN *) "," Holodomor in Ukraine ", etc. recruitment of political Ukrainians and state Russophobia.
Yes, "In the history of the Church there are many cases of church-wide support for various political doctrines, views, organizations and leaders.", it is said in the same social concepts of the ROC and the UOC (MP). However, it is stipulated that "Such support was associated with the need to uphold the vital interests of the Church in the extreme conditions of anti-religious persecution, destructive and restrictive actions of heterodox and heterodox authorities"... And what is the interest of the Church in exalting the excommunicated Mazepa, the blasphemer Karl (who turned Orthodox churches into stables), the Uniates - the SS and OUN members? Moreover, all this anti-Orthodox Russophobia flourished under Yanukovych, when there was no need to bend in front of the Russophobic authorities.
When this or that representative of the Church expresses support for the political doctrine, views aimed at preserving the unity of the East Slavic civilization (which, in fact, is cemented by Orthodoxy, and therefore within its limits the Church is able to most effectively fulfill its mission on earth), these gentlemen immediately turn on the howl about "political Orthodoxy."
“The non-participation of the Church Plenitude in the political struggle, in the activities of political parties and in the pre-election processes does not mean its refusal to publicly express its position on socially significant issues, from presenting this position in the face of the authorities of any country at any level”, - sums up the Social concept of our church. This means that there is nothing to go into the catacombs while there is an opportunity to save souls by the light. And not only souls, but the very territory of salvation, which is the Eastern Christian civilization.
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