I remember that in my youth I read with interest the novel of the writer Andrei Aldan-Semenov “Red and White”, which tells about some significant events of the Civil War. Yes, the author took Bolshevik positions to a greater extent, the book clearly romanticized the figures of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Azin, and a number of others. This was noticeable even when I read the book, in the late 1980s. But on the whole, the book is interesting, large-scale, and makes you think about some problems. In addition to the chronologies of battles between red and white, there are a lot of weighty psychological observations, it is felt that the author drew information for conclusions in the book, as they say, first-hand. According to ideological preferences, the figures of, for example, Kolchak and Kappel and their entourage are drawn by the author with less sympathy than the red army commanders. But still, one moment in several places in the novel by Aldan-Semyonov convincingly proves. This is the degree of decay of the White Army, an indicator of which was the outrageously young age of the bulk of the White generals.
Many experienced generals and senior officers of the tsarist army did not join the White movement due to the fact that the monarchists could not find a common language with the prevailing officer spirit in the White Army of the ideas of Februaryism, republicanism and other “democracies”, and they did not want to have anything to do with the Entente … Other experienced white generals and colonels simply died in action. And literally “boys” who were just over twenty years old were promoted to high-ranking general positions, on which the fate of battles, fronts and armies depended. Usually due to their prowess, shown in any particular battle. Older, thirty or forty-year-old junior or middle officers, seeing the absurdity of the commands of the newly baked young generals, often refused to carry them out or silently did everything in their own way. This was seen by the rank and file of the White Guards. As a result – the decomposition of the army, chaos and confusion, lack of one-man command, the left hand did not know what the right was doing. The Reds had the same problems, but to a lesser extent. Paradoxically, generally speaking, the Red Army had more qualified military specialists, middle-level commanders and military leaders, including those from the former tsarist officers, and “commissars in dusty helmets.” Although, if you look at the age of the same Tukhachevsky, then too – a little over twenty. But Tukhachevsky, despite his young age, still had a good military education, tactical and strategic experience in managing units, and in life, he went through the German camp.
And the conclusion of Aldan-Semyonov: if a person with a general’s potential and a scale of thought is, say, in a captain’s position, then this is more his personal problem, but he performs his functions as a captain soundly and regularly, at an exemplary level. But, if, on the contrary, a person with the psychology of a captain or a lieutenant finds himself in a general’s position, then this becomes a problem for the entire army. The system can still withstand a single case, and subsequently fix it, but if such “lieutenant-generals” are dark, then sooner or later it will end in tragedy. The young age of the white generals was one of the harbingers of the further fiasco of the entire White movement. The question of personnel, so to speak. The above applies not only to military control, but also to any other sphere of life support of the state, to the authorities in general.
Everything positive has its own “golden mean”. One deviation is gerontocracy, for example, under Brezhnev, when older leaders blocked the advancement of younger but already experienced managers. Right now, in the United States, a similar picture is observed in their political elite. Another is “innovative madness”, flirting with youth trends, regardless of which of them lead to what, recruiting for “creativity”. Despite the fact that young people need to be educated in an amicable way, and not flirt with them, as during the premiership of Dmitry Medvedev. Why “innovations”, for what purposes, which of them lead to what is the second question according to the logic of “effective managers”, the main thing is that everything should be creative, ambitious, and tolerant. And the appropriate personnel were selected, who did not know anything that is needed for state development, except for a set of liberal clichés, and also who knew how to retrain and quickly adapt, that is, adapt, at the same time not forgetting about their personal mercantile interests. Here are the “boys-generals”, members of the government under Medvedev – Arkady Dvorkovich, Maxim Akimov, Maxim Oreshkin, Mikhail Kotyukov, Mikhail Abyzov, and a number of others. Young, creative. Some of them, by the way, like Abyzov, have become a prisoner. Well, okay, young white generals in the Civil War were promoted at least thanks to their prowess, personal courage shown in battles. And these “general ministers”, “talented political strategists” and “effective managers”? For what merits were they appointed to the highest responsible positions? What did their “governance” lead to? And was it necessary to include such people in the list of some kind of “personnel reserve”, to conduct them through some “courses”, then to appoint them to high positions, so that later, based on the results of their “activities,” the entire cabinet of ministers headed by the prime minister would be disbanded? ?
By the way, it is precisely this selection of personnel for the future, hiding behind the name of President Putin, that many of today’s competitions for young people are leading. The “school of governors” is also oriented towards this in many respects. I judge by those persons who are now appointed governors of the Russian regions. In terms of age, however, they are no longer so young, but raised by the same “school of reformers,” the same irresponsible boys and remained. However, I have repeatedly noted this, both about Medvedev himself and about all kinds of personnel competitions and “new people”.
The same decomposition in the management system characterizes the presence of women in positions and levels of management that are not typical for the “stronger weaker sex”. I’m not talking about speculative feminist programs and plans to increase women in government. It is a long-standing fashion of all branches and levels of the Russian government to make dubious compliments and preferences to women, constantly artificially increasing their number in government bodies. A specific manager in a specific position must meet relevant gender-independent criteria. In this sense, there is no difference – a man or a woman. The main thing is that the result is positive. And so, there are objectively more women at the middle level of the civil service. If only because office work is more typical for women. But why artificially raise or lower the percentage of men and women in power? Selection criteria – personal, moral, professional qualities. But not a man-woman. Isn’t this an element and the beginning of what we see in full growth in the West with all sorts of “harassment”, twenty sexes, “parents No. 1 and No. 2”, the rights of transsexuals to compete in women’s sports and use the women’s toilet and the like little things? In those issues where a clear division into masculine and feminine is needed – everything is mixed, and where the gender issue does not matter – some rules, levels, percentages for men and women are established. This is managerial insanity!
But for the army – the situation is separate. In an amicable way, there is absolutely nothing for women to do in officer positions. Simply – within the meaning of a woman’s destiny. But recently, for some reason, from some newly imposed tolerant attitudes, they have been cultivating, for example, the image of girls paratroopers, female pilots of combat aircraft, etc. Isn’t this insanity? Isn’t this a guarantee of the future disintegration of the army?
And here is the “cherry on the cake.” Why does the country, and even certain state services, need women generals? And how do some of them become generals themselves? It would be funny, but not laughable, given that this indicator, “women-generals”, is akin to (and even much exceeds) that very indicator of the age-decay of the system by “boys-generals”.
As of last year, there are 44 women in the rank of general in Russia. For today, apparently, already more. Although the source said a year ago that perhaps he did not count all the women generals. And I see that those of the generals who were major generals have already become lieutenant generals over the past year. A particularly interesting distribution of generals in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as many as 16. The indescribable beauty of some of the responsible generals can be admired on a separate link.
As noted, even in the United States, with all its transgender and other transhumanistic bells and whistles, there are only about 20 women generals in various positions. In China, there are only two women in the rank of general. In the Soviet Union, the practice of appointing women to general positions did not exist. And this is not an accident. As you know, military regulations and military traditions were written with the sweat and blood of many generations of ancestors. When there is a violation of the established rules, then system failures begin.
I have no doubt that among these four or five dozen women generals there are indeed those who deserve this high rank. But there are only a few of them. And they, by the way, are devalued by the mass flow of generals. Well, nature simply cannot be deceived! There may be some isolated cases when a woman has earned a high military rank by her deeds, but when this is included in the system, expect trouble.