The main strategy of the war: the spear point is always directed against Russia / USSR
In Moscow, from July 8 to September 5, the exhibition “On the Eve of the Great Patriotic War. September 1, 1939 – June 22, 1941 ”, at which declassified documents were presented, indicating that England and France, our future allies in World War II, planned an attack on the Soviet Union a year earlier than the Third Reich.
The Anglo-French operation in the South of the USSR (“Spear’s Edge”) envisaged massive bombing from Syria on Baku, Grozny, Poti, Maikop and Batumi to destroy the main center of Soviet oil production and refining, as well as the invasion of Transcaucasia by an expeditionary force led by French General Weygand. The operation in the North involved the landing of an expeditionary force in Petsamo and the joint capture of Murmansk and Karelia with the Finns.
Of course, the plans of the Anglo-French aggression have long been no secret (the specific documents presented at the exhibition were secret). Only the attitude towards them in Russia was and remains, as to some incident that is not worth serious attention. However, there is every reason to assert that if it were not for the decisive actions of the Soviet leadership, the USSR already in 1940 would have found itself in a situation incomparably more difficult than in 1941 as a result of the invasion of our country by Hitler’s armada.
The plans of aggression were not plans that the general staffs of all countries of the world make up for all possible and impossible cases of life, as they often try to imagine. They were developed on the direct instructions of the top leadership of England and France. Consequently, they reflected the strategic goals of these states.
Thus, on October 19, 1939, the US Ambassador to Paris W. Bullitt telegraphed to Washington that the French Prime Minister E. Daladier had informed him about the study of the possibility of “bombing and destroying Baku.”
On January 19, 1940, Daladier sent a note to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in France, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, General M. Gamelin, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, Admiral F. Darlan, instructing him to develop options for an operation against the USSR.
On January 24, 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented to the War Cabinet (a special body of the military-political administration of Great Britain during the war) a memorandum “The main strategy of the war”, which proposed strikes against the USSR and reported on the possibility of putting the Caucasian oil industry out of action “For at least nine months.”
On May 10, 1940, the new French Prime Minister P. Reynaud called Churchill to inform him about the readiness of the expeditionary forces to start bombing Baku from May 15. He did not yet know that on that day the Germans put an end to the “strange war” and launched an offensive in the West.
One of the proofs of the curiosity of the Anglo-French plans is often the scantiness of the forces allocated for their implementation (300 thousand in the South and from 100 to 300 thousand in the North). The Second World War was a war of multimillion-dollar armies. It would seem that the argument is deadly – only in a feverish delirium is it possible with such forces to start a war against the USSR.
However, we must not forget how London and Paris were going to fight with the USSR. They did not plan a campaign against Moscow from the South and North, they were going to sow chaos and confusion with the help of these operations, provoke something like a new Civil War. Admiral Darlan reported to Daladier: “There are thousands of political exiles in the Murmansk region and in Karelia, and the inhabitants of the concentration camps there are ready to rise up against the oppressors. Karelia could eventually become a place where anti-Stalinist forces inside the country could unite “…
By a completely “coincidence”, Trotsky published in April 1940 a “Letter to the Soviet Workers” calling for an armed uprising against Stalin.
In the South, the British and French, to help Weygand’s corps, were going to raise uprisings of the mountain peoples. One of the leaders of the separatist movement in the Caucasus, Sultan Klych-Girey (colonel of the Russian army, general of the White Army; after the failure of the Anglo-French plans, went to serve the Reich; hanged in 1947, as befits the separatists) was involved in their preparation by the French General Staff.
Undoubtedly, these forces were completely insufficient for a military victory over the USSR, but London and Paris did not set such a goal. The plans were designed to achieve a different goal. And more on that.
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England no longer denies plans to attack the USSR in 1940, but explains them exclusively with noble motives: 1) to help the Finns repel the aggression of the USSR; 2) to deprive Hitler of access to Soviet oil. Therefore, they say, all the claims to Stalin: he made a pact with Hitler, supplied him with oil, attacked Finland. Because of Stalin, and not because of the leaders of England and France, the future allies in the fight against Nazism almost came together on the battlefield.
This version is now being introduced into the public consciousness. Let’s consider it point by point.
Finland. In September 1939, France and England, despite all the officially signed allied treaties with Poland and with a guaranteed victory over the Reich (absolute superiority over the German covering forces), did not lift a finger to save the Poles. Just 3 months later, the same England and France decided to lie down with bones in an amphibious operation near Murmansk for the territorial integrity of Finland, not allied to them. Rave?
Oil. Even the organizers of the exhibition in Moscow, in the annotation to it, considered it possible to write that London and Paris began to develop plans for “striking the oil-bearing regions of the Soviet Caucasus” in order to “deprive it (the Reich) of supplies of strategic raw materials.” Earnestly? Not at all.
In 1940, oil consumption in Germany was about 10 million tons (with a strategic reserve of 6 million). 669 thousand tons were supplied from the USSR (with the complete technical impossibility of increasing this volume). From Romania – 1.442 million tons (with the possibility of more than two-fold increase). 72.8% of the Reich’s needs were covered by the production of artificial fuel (by the end of the war it will be brought to 97%).
These figures were known in Moscow, they were even better known in London.
That is, London and Paris, being in a state of war with Berlin, were also going to start a war against the USSR, in order, at best, to reduce oil supplies to the Reich by an amount that is not critical for it. Stupidity?
Here it is useful to recall another, allegedly, nonsense – the “policy of appeasement.” According to the official Western version, the entire pre-war period of the British Empire (France is the slave) was engaged only in pacifying Germany. To paraphrase Churchill, she fed the crocodile in the sincere confidence that, having eaten, if not this victim (Austria), then the next one (Sudetenland), he would certainly become a herbivore. Fools, and nothing more.
However, let’s imagine for a moment that the British prime ministers and foreign ministers of the 1920s and 1930s. from Baldwin to Austin Chamberlain to Neville Chamberlain to Halifax were not clinical idiots. And in their actions they proceeded solely from the fact that Britain has neither eternal enemies, nor eternal friends, but only eternal interests.
With this assumption, the “policy of appeasement” is a consistent, pragmatic policy of strengthening defeated Germany to destroy the USSR.
The slogan of the British Conservatives is “For Britain to live, Bolshevism must die.” No one except a pacified / strengthened Germany, preferably in an alliance with Japan, could bring this slogan to life. Then, under the slogan of saving civilization from Bolshevism or fascism (depending on the outcome of the war), France, which possessed the most powerful army in Europe, was supposed to finish off the barely living victor in the Soviet-German war (why its army did not fight in 1940 – a special conversation ).
The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany (the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”) derailed the British scenario of the Second World War. The Reich’s war with Poland did not develop into a war with the USSR in 1939. As a result, England and France unexpectedly found themselves in a position of war with Hitler, pacified by them, under Soviet neutrality.
Therefore, the Anglo-French plans of operations against the USSR in the South and North are not a curiosity. These are desperate attempts to translate the “strange war” into a pan-European crusade against Bolshevism.
Of course, the reckoning was not on Hitler’s anti-communism (they say, he will not be able to stay away from the all-European struggle against Bolshevism). They hoped that Hitler would not resist the temptation to attack the USSR, weakened by the Anglo-French strikes. In February 1940, General Gamelin reported to Daladier: “The fundamental weakness of the Russian economy is its dependence on Caucasian oil. … More than 90% of oil production and 80% of oil refining are concentrated in the Caucasus (mainly in Baku). Therefore, any significant interruption in oil supplies will have far-reaching consequences, and may even lead to the collapse of Russia’s military, industrial and agricultural systems. “… In the opinion of British strategists, as noted above, the USSR will overcome such a collapse caused by massive bombing of oil fields only in 9 months.
Hitler will not be able not to take advantage of the “window of opportunity”. And then everything will go according to the British war scenario. Therefore, the commander of the French Air Force in Syria, General J. Jonot, had reason to assert in the spring of 1940 that “The outcome of the war will be decided in the Caucasus, not on the Western Front”…
However, as the declassified documents presented at the Moscow exhibition show, the plans for London and Paris and their true goals were well known in Moscow: “Support of the White Finns, the creation of a hotbed of war in the south of the Soviet Union, the direction of Germany to the East” (Summary of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army, February 1940).
As a result, Finland was forced to peace on March 13, 1940, before England and France could prepare an expeditionary force for the landing at Petsamo. Calls from London and Paris to Helsinki to hold out a little more did not help.
At the same time, there was a powerful build-up of the forces of the Red Army in the Caucasus. The troops released on the Finnish front were transferred there. On April 4, the People’s Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov reported to the Central Committee on the strengthening of the southern borders by aviation and anti-aircraft artillery: 17 medium-caliber divisions were additionally formed and brought into regiments for the air defense of Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi, Tuapse and Novorossiysk; 7 divisions of small-caliber artillery were formed only for the air defense of Baku.
Strengthening the air defense of the Red Army in the Caucasus forced the Anglo-French command to repeatedly postpone the start of the operation, tk. there was a constant need to strengthen the air force strike group in Syria so that it could guarantee the destruction of Soviet oil production and refining centers. They were postponed to readiness by May 15, 1940, but on May 10, the Germans launched an offensive on the Western Front, and on June 14, the Wehrmacht entered Paris.
Bottom line. Thanks to the effective actions of the Soviet leadership in the spring and summer of 1940, the USSR avoided a war even more terrible than the one that began on June 22, 1941. It would have to fight not only with the Nazi Reich and its satellites, but also with France, and most importantly, with the British empire. In this situation, Japan and Turkey would have entered the war with one hundred percent probability. The forces of the enemies would grow many times over, and the nature of the war – a war to destroy the state and the people – would remain unchanged.
In preparing the material, materials from the exhibition of archival materials “On the Eve of the Great Patriotic War. September 1, 1939 – June 22, 1941 “
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